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ABORTION, PROTEST, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTEC-
TION-Bering v. Share, 106 Wn. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986).
In Bering v. Share,1 the Washington Supreme Court upheld a broad
injunction against the activities of Share, an anti-abortion activist group.
The court found that a restriction of Share's free speech rights was neces-
sary to protect children from the harmful effects of Share's language, and to
protect the constitutional right to abortion. Consequently, the court re-
stricted Share's use of the words "murder" and "kill," and limited Share's
picketing to the side of the medical building. This Note assesses the Bering
court's federal constitutional foundation for its restrictions of protected
speech, and suggests an alternative basis and reduced scope for the injunc-
tion. The Note concludes that although Share's assaultive conduct was not
entitled to first amendment protection, the injunction infringed on Share's
right to free speech.
I. BACKGROUND
A. First Amendment Protection of Speech
The first amendment 2 embraces several essential constitutional values.
One value posits a "market place of ideas," where the truth of an idea is
tested by its acceptance or rejection after public debate. 3 Another value is
the concept of choice behind the democratic process, in which a wide
variety of viewpoints informs the electorate.4 The first amendment also
serves individual self-fulfillment, since suppression of belief or opinion
negates the freedom of mind essential to that process. 5 At the core of
protected speech are public issues that give rise to heated debate.6 Words
selected for both their emotional force and the ideas they convey are
1. 106 Wn. 2d 212,721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. denied for want ofjurisdiction, 55 U.S.L.W. 3494
(U.S. Jan. 20, 1987).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
3. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Police Dep't of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). The market place of ideas represents the adjustment
between rival partial truths, which is better than adherence to one fixed mixture of truth and falsehood.
M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEEcH: THE SuPREME CouRr AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 53 (1966).
4. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Cr. REv. 245, 255.
5. T. EMERSON, THE SYSThM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssIoN 6 (1970).
6. A. MEIKI.EOHN, POLMCAL FREEDOM 42 (1960).
Washington Law Review
protected by the first amendment, 7 including speech that is intended to
embarrass, offend, or persuade the listener. 8
The United States Supreme Court, seeking to preserve the right to free
speech, has developed standards for constitutional restrictions of speech. In
general, regulations of speech must not be based on the speech's content,
unless the speech falls within the narrow exceptions to first amendment
protection or the restriction is essential to meet a compelling government
interest. 9 Speech regulations that are content neutral limit the time, place,
and manner in which the right to free speech may be exercised.
1. Content Neutrality
Restrictions of speech based on the subject matter of the speech, the
identity of the audience or speaker, or the viewpoint being expressed,
distort the free exchange of ideas and violate the principle of government
neutrality. 10 Such restrictions are presumed to be unconstitutional. Restric-
tions of content are carefully scrutinized by the courts to ensure that the
government is not simply trying to suppress a message it finds offensive. I1
A constitutional restriction of speech based on content must either fall
within one of the narrow categorical exceptions to first amendment protec-
tion, or further a "compelling state interest." 12 Categories of speech that
do not receive first amendment protection are obscenity, 13 speech that
7. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (The criminal conviction of a man for wearing a
jacket that said "Fuck the Draft" was unconstitutional. The Court stated that "much linguistic
expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well.").
8. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,911 (1982) (impassioned speeches of black
organizer that did not incite violence were protected by the first amendment); Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (distribution of literature intended to coerce real estate broker to
cease "panic peddling" homes in areas becoming racially integrated was protected by first amend-
ment).
9. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
10. See Barnes, Regulations of Speech Intended to Affect Behavior, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 37, 47
(1985).
11. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM & MARY L. REv. 189, 196-97
(1983).
12. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 602 (1978). See SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 84.
Shapiro criticizes the "overbalancing state interest" analysis, stating that it is unfair to weigh a
compelling state interest against an individual right, because the state interest will always appear more
substantial. The right of an individual should be weighed against a specific governmental right to limit
an activity, not a general interest of the government.
Id.
13. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 53-55 (1973) (upholding an injunction against
showing hard-core films in "adult theaters"). Regulation of obscenity may be aimed to protect children
from obscene or indecent language. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (regulation
prohibiting airing of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue in the early afternoon, when children
were likely to be listening, was constitutional).
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incites immediate violence, 14 including "fighting words,"' 15 and speech
that threatens national security. 16
Prior restraint occurs when the government attempts completely to
prohibit certain speech before it is actually published or spoken, rather than
subsequently punishing it. 17 Prior restraints suppress communication by
inducing caution in the speaker before there is an adequate determination
that the speech is unprotected. 18 Since judicial prior restraints require
abstract adjudications, they may be based on speculation about the expres-
sion's potential harm. 19 This procedural drawback 20 makes prior restraints
particularly antithetical to the values of the first amendment. 21 Prior re-
straints are allowed only when the government can establish with certainty
that the speech is unprotected, 22 and where irreparable harm will occur if
the speech is not prohibited.23
2. Criteria for Restrictions of Time, Place, and Manner
The government may regulate the time, place, and manner of speech
when the regulation meets three criteria. First, the regulation must be
content neutral. 24 Second, it should be narrowly tailored to protect a
"significant" state interest.25 Third, there must be ample alternative forums
14. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969) (statute prohibiting a criminal syndicate was
overbroad in that it was not limited to incitement of immediate lawless action).
15. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,572 (1942) (Fighting words are "those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.").
16. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (conspiracy conviction under the Espionage
Act for circulating literature intended to encourage obstruction of the draft was constitutional).
17. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955).
18. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973).
19. Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint. The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REv. 11, 49
(1981).
20. M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPREssION 127 (1984). The doctrine of prior restraint has tradi-
tionally been applied to both administrative licensing systems and injunctions. Since speech can be
restricted without a hearing under the former system, while the latter requires adjudication by a court,
commentators differ as to whether the doctrine of prior restraint should be applied to both categories of
regulation. Id. (Judicial restraints occur after a full and fair hearing, and are less inimical to first
amendment considerations.) But see Blasi, supra note 19, at 92-93 (both forms of prior restraint,
licensing and injunctions, rely on abstract adjudication, encourage overuse of regulation, and adversely
affect audience reception of a message).
21. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
22. Traditionally, permissible prior restraints could only be applied to obscene materials, incite-
ments to violence that will lead to overthrow of the government, and strategic war secrets. Id. at
590-92. However, prior restraints have also been approved in commercial advertising, since the falsity
of advertising can be easily determined by a court prior to publication. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 730.
23. See L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 731. Government secrets and personal intimacies are forms of
speech for which "more speech" is not an alternative remedy. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (government secrets).
24. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981).
25. Id.
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for communication of the information. 26 Courts have found a significant
governmental interest that supports restrictions of speech in protecting
spatial privacy interests, 27 protecting an audience that is unable to escape a
message, 28 and protecting the primary function of a forum. 29 A regulation
of speech cannot be vague, nor can its scope unnecessarily include consti-
tutionally protected activities along with those that are amenable to consti-
tutional regulation. 30
a. Three Considerations in Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
The state interest of protecting a listener's privacy is influenced by the
forum. A person's reasonable expectation of privacy differs in a public
place as opposed to the home.31 Consequently, the Supreme Court is
particularly reluctant to curtail speech for protection of the listener such
traditional public forums as sidewalks, parks, and streets. 32 However, the
Court may curtail speech that intrudes into the privacy of the listener's
home.33
Courts have sometimes found that the inability of a listener to escape a
message justifies restrictions of time, place, and manner. 34 A captive
audience may be unable to escape because of the physical limitations of a
forum, or the need to use services unique to that forum. 35 The manner in
which the speech is conveyed might contribute to the impossibility of
26. Id.
27. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 318 U.S. 141 (1943) (A statute prohibiting door to door
canvassing was unconstitutional because it was overbroad. However, a less restrictive statute allowing a
homeowner to state her preference to be undisturbed would be constitutional.)
28. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) (municipal
regulation against political advertising on a bus was constitutional since riders were a captive audience).
29. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (picketing may disrupt function of a
school).
30. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568 (1965) (lack of specificity may render statute
unconstitutionally vague).
31. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 233, 263-64 (1974).
32. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
33. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (congressional provision
allowing a homeowner to remove his name from a mailing list after receiving provocative literature in
the mail was upheld).
34. International Soc'y Krishna For Consciousness, Inc. v. New Jersey Sports, Etc., 691 F.2d 155,
162 (3d Cir. 1982).
35. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307-8 (1974). Generally, persons have a
greater ability to escape and a lesser expectation of privacy in public forums. However, the right of an
audience to be let alone in quasi-public forums, such as a sports arena or plaza, has been a factor in
limiting first amendment activities. See, e.g., International Soc'y For Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
McAvey, 450 F. Supp. 1265, 1270-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (persons picnicking in quasi-public forum had
right to be free from intrusion by members of the Krishna sect).
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escaping a message.36 The Supreme Court has protected both captive
audiences and children from certain expressive activities, since neither
audience has the degree of choice that the first amendment presupposes. 37
Regulations of speech may be imposed when the speech is incompatible
with the primary function of a forum. For instance, a statute prohibiting
picketing in front of a courthouse is constitutional. The statute serves the
state interest in protecting the judge and jury from the influence of pick-
eters, which could affect the fairness, or appearance of fairness, of a trial.38
Similarly, a state may have a legitimate interest in protecting a school from
disruption by picketers. 39 Solicitation and leafletting have been constitu-
tionally restricted in hospitals because they impede efficient health care
delivery.40 In any forum, the state has an interest in protecting an audience
from assaultive or disorderly activities. 41
b. Proper Scope of Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
Clarity and specificity are essential to constitutional regulations. Persons
seeking to exercise their first amendment rights, and persons seeking to
enforce the regulations of speech, must know exactly what is prohibited. 42
If a regulation of speech unnecessarily prohibits activities that are pro-
tected by the first amendment as well as those that are not protected, it is
unconstitutionally overbroad. 43
B. The Constitutional Right to Abortion
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to privacy that
precludes governmental interference into certain areas of a citizen's life.44
36. Nudity on a movie screen that can be seen from the highway does not make drivers a captive
audience, because the drivers can always glance away, while a message over an amplified sound system
in a residential neighborhood may create a captive audience since there is no means of escape other than
leaving one's home. Compare Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,212 (1975) (nudity on a
movie screen) with Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (amplified sound system); see also Haiman,
Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 153, 183-84 (1972)
(pursuit by picketer is more invasive than stationary picketing).
37. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757-59 (1978).
38. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
39. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,100 (1972); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972).
40. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 442 U.S. 773 (1979).
41. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941) (injunction
against potentially violent picketers upheld).
42. T. EMERsON, supra note 5, at 364.
43. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967) (disqualification of a teacher
cannot rest solely on membership in the Communist Party without evidence of intent to act unlawfully).
44. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute prohibiting dispensing birth control
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Roe v. Wade45 acknowledged that a woman's right to terminate her preg-
nancy is a part of this right to privacy. While the government cannot create
obstacles to obtaining an abortion, 46 it has no obligation to provide support
for a woman's choice. 47
The federal courts have protected the right to abortion from impingement
by the state. For example, statutes requiring women to have second tri-
mester abortions in a hospital are unconstitutional. 48 Likewise, municipal
ordinances cannot bar elective abortions from being performed in city
hospitals. 49
Courts do not recognize a governmental duty to provide support for a
woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy. Laws that eliminate state and
federal funding of elective abortions for low income women are constitu-
tional, 50 although they may force many women to continue unwanted
pregnancies.
to married persons is an unconstitutional violation of privacy). This right to privacy that ensures
freedom from government interference in personal choices is distinct from the government interest in
protecting spatial privacy, such as the home. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) with Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (prohibition of all door-to-door canvassing that was unconstitu-
tional would be allowed if limited to a prohibition of canvassing homes where occupants had previously
expressed a desire not to be disturbed).
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas statute prohibiting elective abortions is unconstitutional). The
Court based the right to privacy that encompasses abortion on the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 153. It noted that the state has an increasing interest in protecting the fetus as
pregnancy progresses. Id. at 163.
46. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986) (Pennsylvania
statute requiring exposure to medically unnecessary information, including the gestational develop-
ment of a fetus at two week increments, was an unconstitutional infringement of the right to abortion).
47. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 310-11 (1980).
48. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (municipal
ordinance requiring second trimester abortions to be performed in the hospital, parental consent for
minors obtaining abortions, and 24 hour waiting period between signing a consent and the abortion was
unconstitutional).
49. Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974).
50. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 310-11 (1980) (the Hyde Act, prohibiting the use of federal
funds for elective abortions, was constitutional and relieved states of the obligation to fund theraputic
abortions). Reasoning that indigency, not the Hyde Act, restricted poor women's ability to "enjoy the
full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice ... ," the Court held that states are not
obligated to subsidize procedures for which there is no federal funding. Id. at 316. However, a
dissenting opinion noted, "we have heretofore never hesitated to invalidate any scheme of granting or
withholding financial benefits that incidentally or intentionally burdens one manner of exercising a
constitutionally protected choice." Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Another dissenting opinion
stated that denial of Medicaid benefits operationally deprived low income women of the constitutional
right to abortion and violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the constitution. Id. at 338
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
316
Abortion Protest
C. Existing Precedent for Speech Regulation in the Context of Anti-
Abortion Demonstrations
A few lower state courts have decided free speech issues in the context of
anti-abortion picketing. Restrictions on anti-abortion picketing have been
upheld or struck down as a result of weighing the free speech rights of the
picketers against previously existing state interests, rather than against
constitutional guarantees surrounding abortion rights.
In O.B.G.YN. Association v. Birthright of Brooklyn,51 a New York state
appellate division struck down portions of an injunction that prohibited the
use of the words "murder" and "kill" on placards, finding that the content
of the defendant's message was entitled to the Constitution's greatest
protection. 52 Portions of the injunction prohibiting obstruction of access to
the medical building, chanting or shouting, and blocking the parking lots of
the clinic were upheld, to serve the state interest of protecting the health and
welfare of its citizens.53
Another appellate division of the New York courts struck down a place
restriction in Parkned Co. v. Pro-Life Counselling, Inc.54 The Parkmed
court found that prohibiting picketers in a square abutting the clinic was
overbroad, because it restricted peaceful picketing in a quasi-public
forum.5 5 The portion of the injunction against disorderly conduct was
upheld to preserve the normal functioning of the medical building. 56
In Planned Parenthood of Monmouth v. Cannizzaro,57 a New Jersey trial
court balanced the property rights of the abortion clinic owner in conjunc-
tion with the privacy rights of the persons using the clinic against the free
speech rights of anti-abortion picketers. The court sustained an injunction
against blocking access to the medical building and harassing clinic pa-
tients and personnel. 58 The court found that the owner's invitation to the
public to use the clinic property extended only to the private and personal
purposes related to abortion, not to the public's exercise of free speech
rights.59
51. 64 A.D.2d 894, 407 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1978).
52. Id., 407 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
53. Id.
54. 91 A.D.2d 551,457 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1982).
55. Id., 457 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
56. Id.
57. 204 N.J. Super. 531, 499 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (trespassing on the clinic
property and harassing and intimidating staff and patients in the general vicinity was enjoined).
58. Id. 499 A.2d at 540.
59. Id. 499 A.2d at 539.
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II. THE BERING DECISION
A. The Injunction
In December 1984, Share, an anti-abortion activist group, began picket-
ing outside the Sixth Avenue Medical Building in Spokane, Washington.
Physicians practicing in the building sought and were granted a temporary
restraining order in March, 1985. The trial court subsequently issued a
permanent injunction restricting picketing, demonstrating, or "counsel-
ing" to the side of the medical building. The injunction also prohibited oral
reference to physicians, staff, or patients as "murderers," "killers," or
derivatives of those words. 60 Other elements of the injunction prohibited
nonspeech activities of Share. 6 1
Share requested review of the injunction by the Washington Supreme
Court.62 The court affirmed the injunction, but narrowed its scope by
limiting the prohibition of the oral words "murderer" and "killer" directed
at physicians, staff, and patients to times when children were present. The
case was remanded to the trial court for narrowing of the injunction in
accordance with the opinion. 63
B. Facts of Bering v. Share
A variety of health care services, most of them unrelated to abortion, are
offered in the Sixth Avenue Medical Building. 64 The building has limited
access, consisting of one public entrance and a side door with a stairway
that is inaccessible to handicapped visitors. The side door is locked in the
winter.65 The sidewalk abutting the public entrance is narrow, so that two
persons walking abreast would block a third person trying to pass. When
there is snow on the ground, persons must walk in a single file. 66
60. Bering v. Share, 106 Wn. 2d 212, 219, 721 P.2d 918, 923 (1986).
61. This included threatening, assaulting, intimidating or coercing anyone using the building,
obstructing access to the medical building, trespassing on the grounds of the building, and engaging in
unlawful activity directed at the patients and staff. Id.
62. Six picketers were cited for contempt of court after disregarding the trial court's place
restriction. Their appeal to the Washington Supreme Court was joined with Share's. The court upheld
the convictions and assessed attorney's fees against the petitioners. Id. at 219,246-47, 721 P.2d at 924,
938.
63. The injunction was remanded to ascertain the age at which children would be adversely
affected by the prohibited use of the words. Id. at 242, 721 P.2d at 936.
64. These services include pediatrics, prenatal care, laboratory procedures, geriatrics, internal
medicine, outpatient surgery, weight loss counseling, dentistry, psychological counseling, and family
oriented health care. Id. at 216, 721 P.2d at 922.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 224-25, 721 P.2d at 926.
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The trial court's findings of fact showed that Share had forced "counsel-
ing" upon persons using the building, and behaved in a coercive, ag-
gressive, and disorderly manner. The court also found that members of
Share had obstructed access to the building and inflicted physical and
emotional distress upon the patients and staff of the building. 67
C. Reasoning of the Court
1. Prohibition of the Words "Murder" and "Kill"
Reasoning under federal law,68 the court acknowledged that it was
restricting the content of speech in prohibiting use of the words "murder"
and "kill. "69 The court asserted that this portion of the injunction was not
an impermissible prior restraint because it prohibited specific words and
redressed private wrongs, 70 unlike the broad prohibitions present in "clas-
sic" prior restraint cases. 71 The court further stated that several recent
United States Supreme Court decisions had declined to apply the doctrine
of prior restraint, indicating that a "new form" of analysis is to be
employed whenever a state regulates the content of speech.72 The court held
that under the new analysis the controlling question was whether the
prohibition was narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.73
The Bering court found precedent for a compelling interest in protecting
children from harmful language in Ginsberg v. New York,74 where the
state's duty to shield children from erotic literature justified regulation of
obscene materials by the state. 75 The Washington court also cited FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation76 to support a restriction of speech that is outside of the
67. The physicians presented evidence to the trial court showing that the picketers obstructed the
passage of patients on the sidewalk in front of the Medical Building. The physician's evidence further
showed that members picketing on the sidewalk threatened, accused, grabbed, and screamed at
patients. Id. at 218, 721 P.2d at 923. These patients were persons obtaining health care unrelated to
abortion, as well as women seeking to terminate pregnancy. Id. at 218, 721 P.2d at 923.
68. This Note only analyzes the court's reasoning under the federal constitution and federal law. It
does not discuss the state constitutional grounds for the injunction.
69. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 236, 721 P.2d at 932.
70. Id. at 235, 721 P.2d at 932.
71. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statute prohibiting publication
of scandalous or defamatory newspapers); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415
(1971) (injunction against distributing leaflets critical of a real estate agent's activities in a neigh-
borhood that was becoming racially integrated).
72. Bering v. Share, 106 Wn. 2d 212, 236, 721 P.2d 918, 932 (1986).
73. Id. at 236-37, 721 P.2d at 933.
74. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
75. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 238, 721 P.2d at 933.
76. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (administrative regulation prohibiting the radio broadcast of a comedy
monologue containing "vulgar" words at times when children were likely to be listening was upheld).
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unprotected category of obscenity. 77 The Bering court analogized the
"verbal shock treatment" of the Pacifica's monologue's repetitious use of
indecent words78 with the violent speech of Share.79 The court concluded
that the duty to protect children from harmful language extended to
language other than obscenity. 80
The Bering court found that the proscribed words infringed on the
parental duty, as well as the state's independent duty, to children. The court
reasoned that parents of children visiting the medical building were entitled
to discuss abortion with their children when the parents believed the
children could understand and that Share's language interfered with that
right. 81 The court also articulated an independent interest in protecting
children from harm, finding that the words "murder" and "kill" used in
reference to physicians and parents were abusive when spoken to children
who were going to see their doctors. 82 The court concluded there was a
compelling state interest in protecting children from abusive language and
sustained the word prohibition. However, the court stated that a narrowly
drawn injunction must limit the prohibition to times when children are
present.83
2. Constitutional Criteria for the Place Restriction
a. Content Neutrality
Reasoning under federal law, the court decided content neutrality was
not violated even though only Share, a group with a specific viewpoint, was
enjoined. 84 The place restriction was content neutral since it was primarily
directed at Share's conduct, rather than Share's speech. 85 The court rea-
soned that enjoining all picketers, regardless of viewpoint or conduct,
would be overly broad, because there was only one particular group before
the court. 86
77. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 240, 721 P.2d at 935.
78. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 757.
79. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 241, 721 P.2d at 935.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 239, 721 P.2d at 934.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 242, 721 P.2d at 935-36.
84. Id. at 223, 721 P.2d at 925-26.
85. Id.
86. Id.
320
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b. Significant State Interest
In finding a significant state interest, the court analogized Bering to
Heifron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness.87 In Heffron,
the Supreme Court held that the state's interest in controlling fairgrounds
traffic was adequate to sustain a state regulation against soliciting money at
fairgrounds from locations other than designated booths. 88 The setting of
the Sixth Avenue Building presented a similar problem of traffic control. 89
The court also acknowledged state interests in protecting the normal
activity of the Medical Building,90 and the constitutional right to abor-
tion.91 The Bering court decided the place restriction was necessary to
reduce the coercive impact of the picketing on patients and staff of the
Medical Building, since the harassment created an unacceptable infringe-
ment on the constitutional right to abortion. 92
c. Scope of the Injunction
The Bering court stated that protecting the normal activity of the build-
ing could be achieved by limiting the number of picketers, requiring them
to remain a certain distance from the walkway to the entrance, and requir-
ing them to picket in single file.93 However, the court reasoned that because
anti-abortion groups unconstitutionally inhibited the accessibility of abor-
tion by intimidating women while they visited the clinics, and by pressur-
ing physicians not to offer abortions to patients, a further restriction
limiting picketing to the side of the building was essential to protect the
right to abortion. 94 The court construed Roe v. Wade as affording protection
from Share's coercive activities.95
The court reasoned that an injunction narrower than the place restriction
would be based on speculation by the court.. The court could only guess at
the amount of contact with a picketer that would dissuade a woman from
obtaining an abortion. 96 The court found that such "conjecture" could
result in an injunction that allowed picketers to intimidate women and
87. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
88. Id. (members of the Krishna sect challenged the regulation as an infringement of free speech
and religious rights).
89. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 224, 721 P.2d at 926.
90. Id. at 225, 721 P.2d at 926.
91. Id. at 230, 721 P.2d at 929.
92. Id. at 228, 721 P.2d at 928.
93. Id. at 231, 721 P.2d at 930.
94. Id. at 228-29, 721 P.2d at 928.
95. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 227-28, 721 P.2d at 927-28.
96. Id. at 231-32, 721 P.2d at 930.
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prevent them from obtaining constitutionally protected abortions. 97 There-
fore, the court concluded, the place restriction was essential to avoid such
infringement.
The court reasoned that the place restriction did not deprive Share of
ample alternatives for its expressive activities because Share was only
enjoined from one small area. 98 The court noted that Share could picket
anywhere else in the city as well as remain in full view of women who
wanted counseling at the medical building. 99
III. ANALYSIS
In prohibiting reference to physicians and patients of the medical build-
ing as "murderers" and "killers" in the presence of children, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court did not differentiate between protected and unprotected
speech. Consequently, the compelling state interest relied on by the Bering
court has repressive implications concerning the regulation of protected
speech, and is unsupportable under the first amendment.
The Court erred in justifying the place restriction by balancing the right
of abortion against the right to free speech. '00 A woman's right to abortion
protects her from coercion by the state, 101 but it does not protect her from
attempts by private parties to dissuade her from terminating a pregnancy.
Nonetheless, the state has a significant interest in protecting the access
and atmosphere of the medical building from Share's disruptive activities.
This interest constitutionally justifies a place restriction.
A. Prohibition of the Words "Murder" and "Kill" Was
Unconstitutional
While the Bering court reasonably held that the word-prohibition was
not a prior restraint, 102 it failed to establish that the state's duty to shield
97. The Bering court stated, "In the absence of a place restriction, women visiting the clinic for
abortion-related services would be forced to walk a gauntlet of placard-carrying antiabortionists." Id. at
231, 721 P.2d at 930.
98. Id. at 232-33, 721 P.2d at 930-31.
99. Id.
100. "No judicial task is more difficult than balancing the constitutional rights and freedoms of
citizens of this country against conflicting rights and freedoms of their fellow citizens." Id. at 215, 721
P.2d at 920.
101. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
102. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 235, 721 P.2d at 932. The doctrine of prior restraint arguably applies to
the Bering word-prohibition. However, the doctrine of prior restraint concerns restraints that are prior to
dissemination of the message, or prior to a judicial hearing, see L. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 725,
procedural drawbacks that were not present in Bering. The Bering injunction was not prior to Share's
audience exposure to the message. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S.
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children could constitutionally justify the prohibition of protected speech.
The Bering court tried to analogize the prohibited words to obscene and
indecent language, speech that may be constitutionally regulated to protect
children. 103 However, the court neglected to note that obscene or indecent
language is unprotected speech, while Share's speech was safeguarded by
the first amendment. As a result, the court disregarded repressive implica-
tions that follow from creating a compelling state interest in shielding
children from protected speech. The Bering court also misconstrued Su-
preme Court doctrine in finding the Court had retreated from a ban on
content selectivity. 104 Consequently, the state interest in shielding children
from protected speech cannot sustain the word-prohibition of the Bering
injunction.
1. The Bering Court Ignored the Distinctions Between Protected and
Unprotected Speech in Its Articulation of a Duty to Protect Children
The Bering court did not distinguish between the different degrees of
constitutional shelter given to protected and unprotected speech in its
articulation of the state's duty to safeguard children from harmful lan-
guage. The court cited cases that are based on the state's duty to protect
children from potentially harmful unprotected speech. By failing to make
this distinction, the court's reasoning suggests that protected speech can be
prohibited whenever harm to children might result, a result that is unaccep-
table under the first amendment.
376, 390 (1973) (the doctrine of prior restraint did not apply where an injunction against sexist headings
in want ads was based on a continuing course of repetitive conduct). Moreover, the word-prohibition
was not based on an "abstract adjudication," where the potential harm of the speech could only by
surmised. See supra note 20. The Bering court looked to the actual harm that had already occurred to
children. 106 Wn. 2d at 239, 721 P.2d at 934.
The word-prohibition was also unlike traditional prior restraints in the nature of the speech it
suppressed. Traditional prior restraints are aimed at preventing dissemination of information that is
believed to be potentially harmful. See, e.g., New YorkTimes Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(per curium) (governmental prohibition of publication of Pentagon Papers was an unconstitutional prior
restraint); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (court order intended to protect the right
to an impartial jury that prohibited reporting of information concerning a brutal murder was an
unconstitutional prior restraint). The Bering word-prohibition was not intended to prevent dissemina-
tion of the information propounded by the anti-abortionists, but to protect children from a false
perception of their physicians. The word-prohibition resembled a manner restriction in that Share's
message was always available to the audience. Picketers could use the words "murder" and "kill" in
reference to physicians on placards at all times, and use the words without reference to physicians or
patients, (e.g. "Abortion is murder"), in the presence of children. They could orally refer to physicians
and patients as "murderers" and "killers" when no children were present. Unlike most prior restraints,
the picketers were never enjoined from all expression of their belief that physicians and women who
carry out abortions are "killers."
103. See supra note 13.
104. Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
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The Bering court relied upon Ginsberg v. New York, 105 where the
Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting the sale of erotic literature to
minors. The Bering court noted the Supreme Court's holding that certain
language, while it cannot be regulated for adults, can be regulated to
protect minors from "abuses" that could prevent their development into
good citizens. 106 However, the Bering court failed to note the Supreme
Court's reasoning that obscenity, because it is unprotected expression, is
particularly amenable to suppression. ' 07 The Supreme Court did not dis-
cuss the appropriate standard for a regulation of protected speech based on
the state's duty to shield children from harm. 108
The Bering court's construction of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation'0 9 also
blurred the essential distinction between protected and unprotected speech.
The Bering court implied that speech outside of the traditionally un-
protected categories 10 could be regulated in' the interest of protecting
minors, since the Supreme Court condoned such a regulation in Pacifica.
The Bering court cited the "concession" that while the comedy monologue
at issue in Pacifica was neither obscene nor "fighting words," the regula-
tion was constitutional since the the language was harmful to children. I II
However, the Bering court ignored the Supreme Court's assertion in
Pacifica that indecent words in themselves "lie at the periphery of First
Amendment concern."1 112 The Supreme Court further stated that even
indecent language is protected speech when it contains ideas of social
105. 390 U.S. 629 (1967).
106. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 238-39, 721 P.2d at 934.
107. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641. The Supreme Court stated that since obscenity is not protected
speech, the legislature merely needed to show that it was "not irrational" to believe that the language
was harmful to children. Id. at 635, 641.
108. Respondents argued that Share's speech was unprotected "fighting words," since it was
objectively foreseeable that calling children's physicians "baby-killers" at the doctors doorstep was a
use of words "which by their very utterance inflict injury." Respondents Reply to Amici at 9, Bering v.
Share, 106 Wn. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986). However the Supreme Court has narrowed the application
of "fighting words" to speech that is likely to provoke violence by the individuals to whom they were
addressed. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (statute forbidding "opprobrious words
or abusive language" was unconstitutionally overbroad, where the state courts had failed to narrowly
construe as forbidding only "fighting words"). The use of the "fighting words" doctrine to restrict
speech that inflicts injury has been limited to false statements that injure one's reputation. See, e.g.,
Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). The doctrine might be more appropriately applied to the
effect of Share's speech on the reputation of the physicians in the eyes of their juvenile patients.
109. 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
110. The categories are obscenity, speech that incites immediate violence, "fighting words," and
speech that threatens national security. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
11I. Bering v. Share, 106 Wn. 2d 212, 239-40,721 P.2d 918,934 (1986) (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S.
at 757).
112. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743. The Court also emphasized that regulation was appropriate due to
the unique attributes of radio broadcasting. Id. at 749.
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concern."13 Share's language, unlike the Supreme Court's characterization
of the Pacifica monologue, pertains to a public controversy, and the words
"murder" and "kill" are not inherently amenable to government regula-
tion. Consequently, the Pacifica decision does not expand the category of
language that can be regulated to protect children to include the Bering
word-prohibition.
Share's message is more accurately analogized to the expression at issue
-in Cohen v. California. 1 4 In Cohen, the Supreme Court overturned a man's
criminal conviction for wearing ajacket inscribed with the words "Fuck the
Draft" inside a courthouse because the message was expressive activity
protected by the first amendment. Like Cohen's message, the prohibited
message in Bering concerns specific words that use their emotional impact
to convey an idea. The Supreme Court in Cohen noted that the emotive
content of speech is protected by the first amendment 15 and that there is a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process of forbidding particular
words. 116 While the Supreme Court found that the phraseology was "vul-
gar," it declined to prohibit Cohen's message on the basis that children
were present 17 because the words conveyed an idea that was protected
political speech. 118
An interest of the state in shielding children from harmful language,
once established as a rationale for restricting protected speech, has no
limiting principle. 119 Such a state interest implies that any harm to children
is an adequate basis for prohibiting speech, so all political speech that
might result in some type of harm to children can be prohibited in public
113. Id. at 746.
114. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
115. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 16. The Court specifically noted that the word "fuck" was not obscene in this context.
Id. at 20.
118. Id. at 25. The Bering court distinguished Cohen stating, "Unlike the courtroom audience in
Cohen v. California, children entering the Medical Building cannot avoid this harm by simply averting
their gaze, but rather are subject to it until safely out of earshot." 106 Wn. 2d at 241, 721 P.2d at 935
(citation omitted). While the Cohen Court noted that the inscription on Cohen's jacket was unlike the
"raucous emissions of sound trucks blaring outside residences" in that persons in the courthouse could
simply avert their eyes, this consideration pertains to the manner, not the content, of the expression.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21. While the manner of Share's speech may be enjoined, as it was in the portion of
the injunction against screaming at physicians and patients, restriction of content is a distinct considera-
tion that was explicitly rejected by the Cohen Court.
119. In Cohen the Supreme Court rejected an analogous idea stating, "Surely the State has no right
to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among
us. Yet no readily ascertainable general principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to affirm
the judgment below." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
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places. 120 This logical conclusion is inimical to the market place of ideas
that the first amendment seeks to preserve.
2. The Supreme Court Has Not Retreated From a Ban on Content
Selectivity
The Bering court misconstrued the recent Supreme Court decision in
Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission'2' as a change in the
Court's position on content-selective regulations of speech. 122 The court
stated that Consolidated Edison altered the ban on content neutrality found
in the earlier decision of Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley. 123
Mosley and Consolidated Edison are consistent in their reluctance to
regulate speech on the basis of subject matter. In Mosley, the Supreme
Court found that a statute prohibiting only nonlabor picketing in front of a
school house was an unconstitutional content selective regulation of
speech. 124 Similarly, in Consolidated Edison, the Supreme Court found
that a commissioner's decision prohibiting enclosures in customers' bills
that advocated nuclear power was unconstitutional because it restricted
expressive activity on the basis of subject matter. 125 The Bering court
supported its assertion that Consolidated Edison retreated from the Su-
preme Court's previous prohibition of content selection by quoting Consol-
idated Edison's statement that the government can only regulate content
upon a showing that the regulation is precisely drawn to serve a compelling
state interest. 126 However, the statement does not represent a new position
for the Supreme Court. 127 In Consolidated Edison, the Supreme Court
120. For example, the same rationale could have justified a prohibition against referring to Henry
Kissinger as a "murderer" or "baby killer" at Vietnam war protests, because children might suffer
harm in thinking that the Secretary of State murders babies. While this result might be improbable, it
illustrates that the potential for "slippage" on the slope of speech regulation carries more sobering
dangers where protected speech, rather than unprotected speech, is concerned. The Supreme Court,
responding to the concern that a zoning ordinance prohibiting obscene movies would also deter
expression protected by the first amendment, made this point by noting that "there is surely a less vital
interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the border line between pornography and
artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance." Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976).
121. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
122. Bering v. Share, 106 Wn. 2d 212, 238, 721 P.2d 918, 933 (1986).
123. 408 U.S. 92 (1971), cited in Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 238, 721 P.2d at 933.
124. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99.
125. Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980).
126. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 236, 721 P.2d at 933.
127. The Supreme Court, in stating its proposition, cited two earlier cases, First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978), and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 540.
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explicitly declined to enlarge the exceptions to content neutrality. 128 Con-
sequently, there is no support for the Bering court's assertion that the
disfavored position of protected speech regulation has been altered.
B. The Bering Court's Basis for the Place Restriction Was Ill-Founded
The Bering court also engaged in a content selective restriction of speech
by basing the place restriction on the constitutional right to abortion. The
court erred in finding that the right to abortion encompasses freedom from
the protest activities of private parties. Furthermore, basing the scope of the
injunction on speculation was unconstitutional.
1. The Bering Court Violated Content Neutrality
Basing the place restriction on the state's interest in protecting the right
to abortion from infringement by private parties was content selective
because it sought to protect a specific group from a specific message. 129 By
relying on this state interest, the court implied that the degree of protection
from critical speech and conduct offered to a woman seeking abortion
would be greater than that afforded any person obtaining other controver-
sial health services. 130 The Bering court's reasoning based the place restric-
tion on the viewpoint of the protesters and the identity of the audience. 131
Putting greater restrictions on anti-abortion picketers because their mes-
sage is uniquely harassing to women obtaining abortions132 is a violation of
content neutrality.
128. Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 539.
129. "In the absence of a place restriction, women visiting the clinicfor abortion-related services
would be forced to walk a gauntlet of placard-carrying antiabortionists." Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 231,
721 P.2d at 930 (emphasis added).
130. UnderBering's logic, less protection from assaultive picketing would be available for persons
obtaining health care that did not fall within an articulated constitutional right. For example, persons
going to a clinic to obtain narcotics for the treatment of chronic pain would not be protected from
harassment by aggressive demonstrators against drug dependency, since there is no constitutional right
pertaining to that form of medical care.
131. Barnes, Regulations of Speech Intended to Affect Behavior, 63 DEN. U.L. REv. 37, 48-50,
61-63 (1985). Content regulation based on the viewpoint of the speaker occurs when expression of a
specific viewpoint is being regulated. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(conviction of a man circulating literature intended to obstruct the draft was upheld). Content regulation
based on the identity of the audience occurs where speech may have a particularly negative effective on
a certain audience. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (political speech was not allowed on
a military base).
132. The holding in Bering's companion case, Federal Way Family Physicians, Inc. v. Tacoma
Stands Up for Life, 106 Wn. 2d 261,721 P.2d 918 (1986), suggests that the place restriction was based
on Share's conduct. In Physicians, the court struck down a preliminary injunction similar to Bering's
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2. The Right to Abortion Only Extends to Protection From State
Infringement
By enunciating a significant state interest in protecting women from the
harassment of picketers as a part of the constitutional right to abortion, the
Bering court relied on cases in which the right to obtain an abortion was
solely secured against infringement by the state. The court stated that Roe
v. Wade 33 protected the ability of a woman to carry out her decision to have
an abortion, 134 and that Nyberg v. City of Virginia135 shielded physicians
who perform abortions from coercive outside restraints. 136 The court
concluded that the constitutional right to abortion shields women and
physicians from coercion by private parties, but did not acknowledge that
Roe and Nyberg only protect the right to abortion from infringement by the
state. 137 Therefore, neither Roe nor Nyberg are applicable to the issue of
abortion picketing. 138
3. The Court Unconstitutionally Based the Scope of the Injunction on
Speculation
The Bering court speculated that a more limited regulation than the place
restriction would not adequately shield women from the picketers. 139
because the factual record did not show that persons using the clinic were being obstructed or harassed.
If the Bering court were only trying to suppress the message of anti-abortion picketers in the presence of
women obtaining abortions because their viewpoint in itself could dissuade women from terminating
their pregnancies, the place restriction in Physicians would have been sustained.
133. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 227, 721 P.2d at 928.
135. 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 891 (1974).
136. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 227, 721 P.2d at 928.
137. In Roe, a Texas statute prohibiting elective abortions unconstitutionally invaded the right to
privacy. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. In Nyberg, a municipal ordinance that prohibited the
performance of elective abortions in a city hospital was found unconstitutional.
138. The Bering court did not rely on Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct.
2169 (1986), decided by the Supreme Court eight days prior to the Bering decision. In Thornburgh, the
Supreme Court found a Pennsylvania statute to be an unconstitutional infringement of the right to
abortion. One portion of the statute required that personal information about persons obtaining abortion
be reported to the state, and that the reports would be available to the public for copying. The Court
found that the reporting requirements "raise the spectre of public exposure and harassment of women
who choose to exercise their personal, intensely private, right, with their physicians, to end a
pregnancy. Thus, they pose an unacceptable danger of deterring the exercise of that right, and must be
invalidated." Id. at 2182. While this expresses the Court's concern that women not be subjected to
harassment for choosing abortion, the Court's fundamental objection lies with the state action of
facilitating the harassment through the reporting requirements.
139. The court reasoned that a lesser restriction would be conjectural because "it is difficult to
ascertain what constitutes harassment' in the apprehensive mind of a woman coming face-to-face with
the picketers." Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 231-32, 721 P.2d at 930.
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Consequently, the court based the place restriction on the anticipated
mental distress that Share would inflict on women obtaining abortions. 140
Anticipating that speech will be offensive, regardless of the likelihood of
offense, is not an adequate constitutional justification for the limiting
speech protected by the first amendment. 141
The psychological vulnerability of a certain audience, such as women
obtaining abortions, 142 does not justify curtailment of first amendment
rights. In Collin v. Smith, 143 the Seventh Circuit protected the right of a
Nazi group to demonstrate in a Jewish community, where some citizens
were survivors of the German concentration camps. The Collin court
acknowledged that citizens in the community could have a basis for an
action for infliction of severe emotional distress, but declined to prohibit
activities protected by the first amendment in anticipation of that result. 144
The targeted racial vilification in Collins might not deserve constitu-
tional protection.145 However, Collins demonstrates the principle that a
regulation of speech cannot be based on the impact it will have on an
audience. The Bering court's reasoning that confrontation with picketers
might dissuade women from exercising their right to abortion implies that
the government has a role in regulating speech on the basis of whether the
speaker can successfully persuade an audience. 146 In a related context, the
140. Id.
141. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
142. Studies show a low incidence of psychological complications from abortions. Women who
were unable to obtain desired abortions have a greater incidence of psychological upset than women
obtaining abortions. The degree of guilt experienced after obtaining an abortion is positively correlated
with the difficulty of making the decision. The ease of attaining an abortion and the attitudes of the
professional staff, as well as support by parents and partners, decrease the difficulty of the decision to
terminate a pregnancy. Osofsky & Osofsky, The Psychological Reaction of Patients to Legalized
Abortion, 42(1) AM. J. OrrHoPsgcrArR, 48-49, 56-58 (1972); Bracken, Klerman & Bracken, Coping
With Pregnancy Resolution Among Never-Married Women, 48(2) AM. J. ORTHopsvcHIATRY 320, 321
(1978); see also Bracken, Hachamovitch & Grossman, The Decision to Abort and Psychological
Sequelae, 158(2) J. NERvous & METAL DISEASE 154,321 (1974). From these findings, one might infer
that harassment by anti-abortion picketers would increase the guilt of women after abortion. However,
there are no studies on the immediate effect of this type of harassment on women who are terminating a
pregnancy.
143. 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.) (declaring village ordinances unconstitutional), aff'd, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
144. Collin, 578 F.2d at 1206.
145. This form of speech conflicts with the value of equality, an independent right that must be
recognized, arguably at the expense of free speech. D. DowNs, NAzs IN SKOKIE 151-53 (1985). But see
Rubin, Book Review, 74 CALM. L. REv. 233 (1986) (reviewing NAZIS IN SKOKIE).
146. The Bering court also injected its own evaluation of the worthiness of Share's cause into the
decision by determining that Share's language, apart from its conduct, was "harassment." Bering, 106
Wn. 2d at 232, 721 P.2d at 930. Women obtaining abortions experience anti-abortion picketing as an
unwarranted invasion into a personal decision. Antiabortion picketers perceive that "harassment" as
"counselling." Characterizing the speech as either harassment or persuasion adopts the perspective of
one party.
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Supreme Court rejected "protection" of citizens through suppressing infor-
mation as "highly paternalistic. "147
Roe v. Wade 48 did not advocate this protection of women from the
abortion debate. The Supreme Court noted in Roe that the widely divergent
viewpoints on abortion are conclusions based on an individual's exposure
to various viewpoints and life experiences, 149 and implied that a market
place of ideas, uninhibited by governmental "predilection," is the appro-
priate arena for choosing or rejecting abortion. 150
C. A Solid Foundation for the Place Restriction
A place restriction based on the state interest in maintaining the access
and atmosphere of a medical building would be constitutional. 151 This state
interest is content neutral, since it is not dependent on the viewpoint of the
picketers for validity. 152 The Supreme Court has found a significant state
interest in the health of its citizens. This interest encompasses maintaining
a tranquil environment for receiving medical services and ensuring those
services will not be impeded by activities unrelated to the primary purpose
of the facility. 153 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that restricting
expressive activities on sidewalks abutting certain facilities is appropri-
ate. 154
147. In Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a ban on advertising by pharmacists was necessary to protect
consumers from buying medicine of an inferior quality due to the price. The Court noted, "the State's
protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance."
It then rejected this "paternalistic" approach, stating, "The alternative is to assume that this informa-
tion is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to
close them." Id. at 769-70.
148. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
149. The Supreme Court noted, "the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of
the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute
convictions that the subject inspires." Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
150. Id.
151. See Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 248, 721 P.2d at 939 (Dolliver, C.J., concurring).
152. The state interest in preserving the atmosphere of a health care facility is uniquely violated by
Share's specific message that doctors are "baby killers." However, the interest is content neutral in that
the state seeks to protect children from potential physical harm rather than from a certain belief about
abortion. This content neutrality resolves the apparent discrepancy between the holdings of Bering and
the companion case Federal Way Family Physicians, Inc. v. Tacoma Stands Up for Life, 106 Wn. 2d
261, 721 P.2d 946 (1986), where the facts did not support a similar finding of harm. Content neutrality
similarly dispels the implication that persons disrupting a health care facility in a manner similar to
Share's, but conveying a different message, would not be similarly enjoined. See supra notes 129-32
and accompanying text.
153. NLRB v. Baptist Hosp., 442 U.S. 773, 783, 788 (1979) (labor solicitation can be limited to
certain areas of a hospital to protect an atmosphere that is conducive to health and to prevent obstruction
of the hallways that would impede efficient health care).
154. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1974) (restriction of picketing in the
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1. Access to Medical Services
Share's activities. impeded access to the medical building. 155 Patients
obtaining services other than abortion were affected in their ability to
obtain health care. 156 Patients requiring urgent medical attention were
delayed by having to force their way through the picketers to reach the
entrance. 
157
The Bering court stated that limiting the number of picketers, requiring
them to march single file, and prohibiting them from the walkway would be
adequate to preserve access to the medical building.158 However, the facts
do not support this assertion. Access to the medical building is limited, 159
and Share's testimony to the trial court indicated that their definition of
obstructing access was unreasonably narrow. 160 The place restriction pro-
vides a bright line that would adequately protect the state interest of
protecting access to health care, while the measures suggested by the court
would require impractical supervision and continual judicial management.
vicinity of a schoolhouse); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (restriction of protest in the vicinity
of a courthouse).
155. The physicians at the medical building brought suit only when the picketers began to affect
the safety of their patients. Bering v. Share, 106 Wn. 2d 212, 216, 721 P.2d 918,922 (1986). Brief of
Appellants at 3, Brief of Respondents at 2, Bering.
156. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 218,721 P.2d at 923. A nurse employed by a pediatrician with an office
in the building testified that their patients were also being interfered with. Brief of Respondents at A-5,
Bering. Other staff of the medical building noted that the picketers had an upsetting effect on pregnant
women. Id. at A-8.
157. A woman who was 37 weeks pregnant with possible toxemia suffered an aggravation of her
hypertension after forcing her way into the Medical Building. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 218, 721 P.2d at
923. A woman was miscarrying had to elbow her way through the picketers to reach the nurse who was
waiting for her at the entrance of the building with a wheel chair. Id.
Bering does not raise the issue of whether an abortion clinic standing alone would be shielded by the
state interest in protecting a health care facility. Since abortion is generally not an emergency
procedure, the rationale that unimpeded accessibility is essential for patients requiring urgent medical
care is less applicable. However, the state interest in protecting abortion would be coextensive with its
interest in protecting the accessibility of any other nonemergency medical care since judicial discrimi-
nation between abortion and other elective or prophylactic medical procedures would be state action.
158. See Bering, 106 Wn. 2d 212, 721 P.2d 918. But see id. at 248,721 P.2d at 939 (Dolliver, C.J.,
concurring).
159. The narrow sidewalk abutting the medical building forces persons to cut across the lawn
during the summer when there are picketers on the sidewalk, and leaves no alternative access in the
winter. Id. at 224-25, 721 P.2d at 926.
160. During trial court testimony, photographs presented by the plaintiffs showed pedestrians
walking in the street to get by the picketers on the sidewalk. Members of Share consistently stated they
did not block the sidewalk, and moved out of the way upon request. When shown the photograph, one
member of Share stated she believed the pedestrian was in the street out of personal preference. Record
at 22, 23, 25, 27, Bering (copy on file at Washington Law Review). Picketers have stated they will
disregard the injunction, raising enforcement problems due to intentional noncompliance. Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, Jan. 21, 1987, at A-4, col. 1. Measures such as limiting the number of picketers and
requiring them to march single file could be more difficult to enforce than the place restriction, since
non-compliance may be less immediately apparent.
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2. Suitable Atmosphere for Medical Services
A place restriction is essential to preserve the atmosphere of the medical
building for similar reasons. The evidence presented to the trial court in
Bering indicated that Share's activities were disruptive of the atmosphere of
the entire medical building. 161 While the court enjoined threatening, as-
saulting, intimidating or coercing anyone using the building, 162 these
determinations depend on interpretation. This again could lead to discre-
tionary enforcement 163 and the need for continuing judicial manage-
ment. 164 The place restriction, by providing a protective distance between
Share and persons using the medical building, would contribute to a less
hostile environment in the immediate vicinity of the medical building while
avoiding the need to base the injunction on a distinction that depends upon
the judgment of the individual enforcing it.
Maintaining an appropriate atmosphere for health care encompasses
protecting children from the harmful effects of Share's speech. Evidence
presented at the trial court indicated that children were unduly frightened
by the prospect of visiting their physicians as a result of Share's speech. 165
Children took literally the message that their physicians were "murders" or
"killers" and were reluctant to receive medical treatment. 166 Rhetoric that
161. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 218, 721 P.2d at 923.
162. Id. at 219, 721 P.2d at 923.
163. Regulations of speech requiring discretionary enforcement are unconstitutional. Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569 (1965).
164. Screaming as a form of intimidation is an example of this potential difficulty. Share testified
that there was never any screaming or yelling, while the plaintiffs presented testimony that members of
Share frequently yelled and screamed their message at persons going into the building. Brief of
Respondents at A-2, A-4, Bering. At times, picketers could be heard from inside the building, through
two sets of doors. Record at 191-92, Bering.
165. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 239, 721 P.2d at 934. For example, a mother taking her three and a half
year old son to a pediatrician's office in the medical building testified that her child was frightened,
reluctant to receive medical care, and had nightmares the night after going to the doctor. She attributed
the child's fright to overhearing a picketer telling her that the physicians in the building were "baby-
killers," since the child was not usually afraid of his doctor. Respondent's Reply to Amici at A-1-4,
Bering. Testimony included similar incidents. See Brief of Respondents at A-8, A-9, Bering. A child's
lack of trust in the physician could also detrimentally affect the child's health by impeding diagnosis if
the child is unwilling to confide in the physician.
166. The characteristics of the intellectual development of children indicate that the message
"Your doctor is a baby-killer" will be taken literally by preschool and some school age children. Pre-
school children do not distinguish between reality and fantasy, while a literal interpretation of language
is a characteristic of children between the ages of six and twelve. L. STONE & J. CHURCH, CHILDHOOD
AND ADOLESCENCE: A PSYCHOLOGY OF THE GROWING PERSON 276, 346, 397 (1973). Piaget found that
children under age seven were unable to consider several aspects of a situation simultaneously. H.
GINSBURG & S. OFFER, PIAGET'S THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT 110-11 (1979).
Members of the Supreme Court in both Ginsberg and Pacifica noted that children do not have "that
full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of first amendment guarantees." FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757 (1978) (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,649-50 (1967)). In Bering,
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physicians who perform abortions are "baby killers" receives constitu-
tional protection, since it has emotive force and addresses a public issue. 167
This constitutional protection precludes limiting the discourse to make it
entirely suitable for children. 168 However, the importance of protecting the
abortion discussion is diminished in the narrow situation where it poses
potential physical harm to children. Share's speech infringed on the state
interest in preserving the health of citizens when that speech instilled a fear
of doctors in children in the immediate vicinity of physicians' offices.
The place restriction is the least restrictive means of maintaining an
appropriate environment for the medical building. It disrupts the right to
free speech less than the prohibition of certain words, and it does not pose
the same practical difficulties in administration. The word-prohibition
would be difficult to follow and enforce, because its application depends on
the age of the children in the vicinity. 169 It places a burden on picketers to
discover the presence and age of children, or to refrain entirely from using
the prohibited words in reference to physicians. This uncertainty alone may
be of sufficient magnitude to invalidate the word-prohibition. 170 The place
restriction protects children from the frightening impact attributable to the
physical proximity of the picketers. 171 While children can hear picketers
yelling from the side of the building, the place restriction allows some
intercession by parents to limit the impact of the verbal message.
3. Share's Right to Protest Abortion Has Constitutional Limits
No solution to the problem in Bering can completely satisfy the compet-
ing interests at stake. Any regulation of speech will result in the inability of
the picketers to express themselves in a manner they feel is appropriate to
their moral duty. Any regulation less than a complete prohibition of
picketing will have some disruptive effect on the function of the medical
young children had no choice but to take the message that their physicians were "murderers" or
"killers" literally.
167. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
169. The injunction was remanded to ascertain the age at which children would be adversely
affected by the prohibited use of the words. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 242, 721 P.2d at 936.
170. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has denounced require-
ments that force a speaker to steer away from protected speech due to the vagueness or overbreadth of its
scope. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (statute imposing criminal liability on anyone who
publicly "treats contemptuously" the United States flag was impermissibly vague under the fourteenth
amendment and overbroad under the first amendment).
171. The sidewalk where Share could picket is approximately 45 feet from the medical building
entrance. Telephone interview with Jeffrey Fner, attorney for the respondents (Nov. 23, 1986). This
distance would at least preclude recurrence of some tactics which frightened children. There was
evidence at the trial court that picketers grabbed at children, and attempted to show children pictures of
aborted fetuses. Brief of Respondents at A-9, A-11, Bering.
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building. However, the place restriction is the most suitable method of
balancing the competing interests. Persons using the medical building will
be exposed to a message they might find offensive, but the access to and
atmosphere of the medical building will be protected from extreme disrup-
tion. The place restriction will not completely shield children from Share's
harmful use of the words "murder" and "kill," but it lessens the frighten-
ing impact of the picketer's proximity and gives parents some opportunity
to safeguard their children from the mistaken impression that visiting the
doctor poses a threat to their lives or well-being. 172 As the Bering court
noted, Share has ample alternative forums for espousing its viewpoint, and
its expressive activities would still have an impact on persons using the
medical building. 173 Share will be able to reach adults with their belief that
the physicians performing abortions in the building are "murderers." The
place restriction is a bright line that balances competing interests by giving
Share notice of exactly what behavior will result in arrest, and by providing
persons using the building with free access and the benefits that result from
simple enforcement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court enunciated a vital state interest in
finding that Share's right to free speech did not include disruption of a
health care facility. 174 However, by upholding the place restriction on other
grounds and sustaining the word-prohibition, the court infringed on
Share's first amendment rights and neglected to consider essential constitu-
tional values.
The court's prohibition of the words "murder" and "kill" unconstitu-
tionally suppressed Share's protected speech. Since the harmful effect of
Share's speech on children was unique to the setting of a medical building,
shielding children from the mistaken belief that visiting the doctor poses a
physical threat is encompassed in the state interest of protecting an appro-
priate environment for receiving medical care.
The Washington Supreme Court also erred in basing the place restriction
on the right to abortion. A woman's right to obtain a legal abortion with
immunity from any governmental interference in her decision is separate
from the right of private citizens to influence others with their viewpoint on
abortion. When the abortion debate escalates into disruption of the provi-
sion of medical services, the state interest in protecting the ability of
172. The frightening impact of the message on a child may be mitigated when the picketers are at a
distance. A parent can protect a child by placing herself or himself between the picketers and the child.
173. Bering, 106 Wn. 2d at 232-233, 721 P.2d at 930.
174. Id. at 225, 721 P.2d at 927.
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citizens to obtain health care in an environment that is compatible with that
purpose justifies the regulation of expressive activity.
The place restriction can be sustained as the most narrowly drawn means
of meeting the significant state interest of protecting the medical building
from disruption. While no solution could fully meet the competing inter-
ests of both Share and the state, the place restriction contributes to an
appropriate atmosphere at the medical building without unduly sacrificing
potent discourse between adults.
Carrie Miller
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